





Ismayilov, H.; Potters, J.J.M.
Publication date:
2012
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ismayilov, H., & Potters, J. J. M. (2012). Promises as Commitments. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-064).
Economics. http://hdl.handle.net/10411/18797
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.


















































Huseyn Ismayilov † Jan Potters ‡
July 19, 2012
Abstract
We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form
pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there
is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50%
probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We find that
even when messages are not delivered trustees who make a promise are
significantly more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a
promise. This suggests that a promise has a commitment value which is
independent of its impact on the trustor. Interestingly, we also find that
both trustees who make a promise and those who do not make a promise
are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the trustor.
This means that communication increases trustworthiness irrespective of
the content of messages.
Keywords: Promises, communication, trust, beliefs, experimental eco-
nomics.
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Experimental evidence has shown that pre-play messages from trustees to trustors
enhance trustworthy behavior. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) provide an ex-
planation for this impact of messages on trustee behavior that is based on expec-
tations based guilt aversion theory. By sending a promise to act cooperatively the
trustee increases the expectations of the trustor that the trustworthy action will,
in fact, be chosen. This increase in expectations of the trustor, in turn, makes
the trustee feel guiltier in case he or she were to choose the non-cooperative ac-
tion. Thus, the attractiveness of the non-cooperative action diminishes for the
trustee when a promise is made. We call this the expectation-based explanation
for promise keeping in line with Vanberg (2008).
There is, however, disagreement regarding the validity of this explanation.
Vanberg (2008) tests the expectation-based explanation and rejects it. Vanberg
(2008) shows that in a modified version of the dictator game higher expectations
of recipients do not make cooperative behavior by dictators more likely if these
expectations are driven by promises made by other dictators.1 Vanberg (2008)
thus rejects the expectations-based explanation and concludes that people keep
promises because of a preference for keeping their word per se. We call this the
commitment-based explanation for promise keeping as in Vanberg (2008).
Ellingsen et al. (2010) test the expectations based guilt aversion theory in
a setup without pre-play messages. The authors first ask trustors about their
expectations and later reveal those to trustees before they make a choice. The
results show that trustee behavior is not affected by the expectations of the
trustor. This evidence rejects expectations based guilt aversion theory which is
the basis for the expectation-based explanation for promise keeping.
It should be noted that authors who advocate the commitment-based expla-
nation do it by rejecting the expectation-based explanation for promise keeping.
There is no direct test of the commitment-based explanation, though.
In this paper, we report experimental evidence in support of the commitment-
1The design of the experiment is such that even when dictators are matched with a recipient
to whom they did not send a message they can infer whether the expectations of the recipient
were shifted or not. For details see Vanberg (2008).
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based explanation. In our experimental trust game trustees had an opportunity to
write a pre-play free-form message to trustors. The essence of our design is that
a message written by the trustee was delivered to the trustor with probability
1
2
. When writing a message the trustee knew that it might not be delivered to
the trustor. After the message was written, a random draw was made and the
trustee learned whether his or her message would be delivered or not. Thus,
in our experiment 50% of the trustees wrote a message that was not delivered
to the trustors. The messages written by the other 50% were delivered to their
respective trustors. Within both groups some trustees made a promise and some
did not make a promise.
We find that a written promise was more likely to be kept if it was delivered to
the trustor (59%) than if it was not (39%). Interestingly, we also find that trustees
who did not make a promise were more likely to be trustworthy if their message
was delivered (45%) than if it was not (11%). The fact that a message was
delivered enhanced trustworthiness irrespective of whether a promise was made or
not. This suggests that the positive impact of communication on trustworthiness
does not depend on the content of the message.
These results also show that making a promise increased trustworthiness of
the trustee by 14% (from 45% to 59%) if the message was delivered, and by 28%
(from 11% to 39%) if the message was not delivered. By design, if the message
was not delivered, a promise could not have affected the trustor. This result
supports the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping.
2 Experimental Design and Procedure
2.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment is based on the trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
as depicted in Figure 1. There are two players in this game, A and B. First, A
chooses to play In or Out. Next, B chooses Roll or Don’t Roll a six sided die.
If A chooses Out, then B’s choice is irrelevant and both players get 5 Euros. If
A chooses In and B chooses Don’t Roll, A receives 0 and B receives 14 Euros.
Finally, if A plays In and B plays Roll, then B gets 10 Euros and rolls a six sided
3
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[p = 1/6] [p = 5/6]
Figure 1: Trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), we allow B to write a pre-play message
to A. However, in our design with probability 1
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a message written is not delivered
to A. This is known to both A and B. After writing a message, B learns whether
his message will be delivered to A or not from the outcome of a random draw.
If A receives no message, A knows that the message by B was not chosen to be
delivered. The timeline for the pre-play message stage is shown in Figure 2. After
the pre-play message stage, the trust game depicted above is played. Instructions
are provided in Appendix A.
B writes a message
After a random draw, B
learns whether the message
will be delivered or not
If the message is chosen it is
delivered to A, otherwise A
receives no message.
Figure 2: Timeline of the pre-play message stage
With this design, we obtain observations where messages from B are not
delivered and observations where messages from B are delivered. In what follows
we call the former the Message not delivered condition and the latter the Message
delivered condition. Within both conditions there will be some Bs who make a
promise to Roll and some who do not make a promise to Roll. Note that in the
Message not delivered condition a promise made by B cannot affect A.
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Table I presents predicted Roll rates under the commitment-based explanation.
In the Message delivered condition one would expect a higher Roll rate with
promises than with no promises. In the Message not delivered condition we,
similarly, expect a higher Roll rate with promises than no promises given that
people have a preference for keeping their word per se. No effect of messages
being delivered is predicted on those who make a promise nor on those who do
not make a promise.
Table I
Predictions under the commitment-based explanation
B’s Roll rate
Condition Promise No Promise
Message not delivered Y% > X%
= =
Message delivered Y% > X%
Table II
Predictions under the expectations-based explanation
B’s Roll rate
Condition Promise No Promise
Message not delivered X% = X%
< =
Message delivered Y% > X%
Table II presents predictions under the expectations-based explanation. Basi-
cally, under the expectation-based explanation Roll rates should follow the second-
order beliefs of trustees. In the Message delivered condition the prediction is
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similar to that under the commitment-based explanation. In the Message not de-
livered condition the Roll rates for trustees who make a promise and trustees who
do not make a promise are predicted to be same given that we do not expect any
difference in second-order beliefs between the two groups. One would also expect
no difference in second-order beliefs of trustees who do not make a promise in
the Message not delivered condition and in the Message delivered condition and
thus similar Roll rates. To be able to test these predictions we elicit subjects’
beliefs (details are provided in Appendix B).
2.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the CenterLab, Tilburg University. Subjects
were students recruited via email invitations. 10 sessions were conducted with
a total of 216 participants (there were 20 subjects per session in 6 sessions, and
24 subjects per session in 4 sessions). Average earnings were around 11 Euros
per session (including a 3 Euros show-up fee). The duration of each session was
approximately one hour.
Subjects were seated behind visually partitioned workstations upon arrival.
At the beginning the instructions were distributed and read aloud. Questions
were answered privately. Half of the subjects were assigned the role of A and the
other half the role of B. Each A was matched with a B to form a pair. Sheets
with identification numbers and a letter B on top were distributed to all Bs. Each
B knew his or her identification number, but no other subject did. We allowed
enough time for all Bs to write a message to A in his or her pair. If B did not
want to write a message he or she could circle the letter B on top of the sheet.
After all Bs finished writing a message and put their message sheets face down,
the experimenter collected all message sheets. The experimenter quickly checked
the compliance of the messages with anonymity rules. Then, the identification
numbers of all Bs were shuffled and exactly half of them were randomly chosen
and publicly revealed. With this procedure it was common knowledge to both A
and B whether the message was delivered or not. The messages of those Bs whose
numbers were chosen were distributed to the respective As. The message sheets
of Bs whose messages were not chosen were replaced by empty sheets. Thus,
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in all pairs A received a sheet, either empty or with a message, depending on
whether a message was chosen to be delivered in that pair or not. Note that an
empty sheet was different from delivered message without text, since the latter
had the letter B circled on top. The identity of subjects in pairs was not revealed
at any time.
After the messages were delivered to the respective As, the game depicted in
Figure 1 was played using the strategy method. That is B chose Roll or Don’t
Roll before knowing A’s choice for In or Out. Unlike the pre-play message stage,
the actual game stage was computerized using Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007).
Subjects entered choices on their screens. After choices were made by all As and
Bs the experimenter approached each B to roll a die. To ensure anonymity all
Bs rolled a die irrespective of their choice and entered the outcome of the die roll
on their screen. The game was played for one round only. After the payoffs were
realized subjects were paid privately and in cash.
To elicit beliefs subjects could earn money by correctly guessing the outcome
of the game. We followed closely Vanberg (2008) in revealing beliefs of players
with some minor differences to ensure that A would not be able to infer whether
B rolled or not from the payoff received for guessing. For details see Appendix
B.
3 Results
In total we obtained observations for 108 pairs, 54 pairs each in the Message
not delivered condition and in the Message delivered condition. We coded each
message as a promise or no promise. The classification is available in Appendix
C. For both conditions combined, 70 out of 108 Bs (65%) made a promise to
Roll : 36 out of 54 Bs (67%) in the Message not delivered condition and 34 out
of 54 Bs (63%) in the Message delivered condition.
Table III presents the Roll rates by Bs who made a promise and by Bs who
did not for each condition separately and for the combined data. For trustees who
made a promise the Roll rates were significantly higher if a promise was delivered
to the trustor than if it was not (59% vs 39%). Note, however, that there was
also a positive effect of the message being delivered on Roll rates of trustees who
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Table III
Promises and Roll ratesa
B’s Roll rate
Condition Promise No Promise Z stat Row total
Message not delivered 14/36 2/18 2.11** 16/54
(39%) (11%) (30%)
Message delivered 20/34 9/20 0.98 29/54
(59%) (45%) 54%
Z stat 1.67** 2.30** — 2.54***
Column total 34/70 11/38 1.98** 45/108
(49%) (29%) (42%)
a The Z stat reflects two sample proportion test for the two populations. *, **, and *** denote
significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively for one tailed test.
did not make a promise (45% vs 11%). In other words, we observe increased Roll
rates with communication not only for trustees who made a promise but also for
trustees who did not make a promise.
From the table we can also observe the differences in Roll rates between
trustees who made a promise and trustees who did not make a promise. For the
combined data, the Roll rates are higher for those who made a promise (49%)
than for those who did not (29%) and this difference is statistically significant. In
the Message delivered condition there was, also, a correlation between promises
and choices. Here, for Bs the magnitude of the difference in Roll rates is 14%, but
it is statistically insignificant. In fact, this result is close to that obtained for the
(5,5) Messages treatment in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). In the Message
not delivered condition the Roll rates by Bs are significantly higher for those who
made a promise (39%) than for those who did not (11%). The fact that promises
are correlated with choices even when they are not delivered provides support
for the commitment-based explanation for the promise keeping. In the discussion
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section we elaborate more on this result.
Table IV





Message delivered 1.88** 1.89**
(0.87) (0.91)






Log likelihood -67.13 -60.44
a Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 108 for both regressions. *,
**, and *** denote significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively.
To further analyse the results for trustees (Bs), we ran logit regressions.
The estimates are reported in Table IV. The estimated coefficients confirm that
promises and Roll rates are correlated (p<0.05). In addition, there is a posi-
tive and significant effect of the messages being delivered (communication). Im-
portantly, the interaction effect between the promise dummy and the message
delivered dummy is insignificant indicating that the effect of the promises did
not depend on messages being delivered or vice versa. The estimated coefficients
are hardly affected when we control for the second-order beliefs of trustees. This
means that the positive effects of promises and the messages being delivered (com-
munication) cannot be explained by changes in second-order beliefs of trustees.
We describe how we measured beliefs, and report some additional results, in
Appendix B.
Finally, table V reports results for As. One can see that As were more likely to
play In when they received a promise (76%) than when they received a message
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with no promise (55%). Interestingly, even when messages contained no promise
As were more likely to play In (55%) than when they received no message at all
(31%) (Z stat=1.85, two sample proportion test, p<0.05, one tailed).
Table V
Promises and In ratesa
A’s In rate
Condition Promise No Promise Z stat Combined
Message not delivered 17/54 17/54
(31%) — (31%)
Message delivered 26/34 11/20 1.64** 37/54
(76%) (55%) (69%)
a The Z stat reflects two sample proportion test for the two populations. *, **, and *** denote
significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively for one tailed test.
4 Discussion
In our experiment promises and trustworthiness are correlated even when mes-
sages are not delivered. We argue that this is in support of the commitment-based
explanation: i.e. that there is a cost of breaking one’s promise per se.
First, note that if promises were correlated with second-order beliefs of trustees
when messages were not delivered, then we cannot reject the expectation-based
explanation. In other words, it might be that those who made a promise had
higher second-order beliefs than those who did not make a promise even when
messages were not delivered. However, in Appendix B we show that when mes-
sages were not delivered promises were not correlated with second-order beliefs.
The average second-order beliefs were equal for those who made a promise and
those who did not. This means that the positive correlation between promises
and Roll rates cannot be explained by changes in second-order beliefs.
Second, it might be argued that when messages were not delivered promises
might be correlated with trustworthiness not because of a cost of breaking a
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promise per se but because the messages were observed by the experimenter.
While our experimental procedures were not double blind, it was practically im-
possible for the experimenter to remember all messages sent by trustees and then
map them to individuals and choices. Note that the messages were handwrit-
ten while the choices for the trust game were entered on the computer screen.
This was made clear to subjects in instructions. Additional evidence is provided
by Deck et al. (2011). The authors ran a double blind protocol of the trust
game with pre-play messages and found similar results to those of Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006). This result suggests that ’an experimenter effect’ is not an
issue in the trust game with pre-play messages.
Third, one can argue that the correlation we observe between promises and
trustworthiness when messages are not delivered is possibly due to self selection.
By this argument, those who make a promise are more likely to be trustworthy
not because they are affected by the promise made but because trustworthy
trustees are more likely to make a promise than untrustworthy ones. However,
we argue that to observe this kind of self selection one still needs to assume
that for some trustees there is a cost of breaking a promise even when it is
not delivered. To see this, note that our results show that for trustees who do
not make a promise a message being delivered increases trustworthiness. This
suggests that some trustees write no promise, choose Don’t Roll if the message is
not delivered, and choose Roll if the message is delivered (call this strategy (no
promise, Don’t Roll, Roll)). Given that making a promise makes it more likely
that the trustor will trust if the message is delivered and that there is no cost of
breaking a promise if the message is not delivered, this strategy is dominated by
the strategy write a promise, Don’t Roll if the message is not delivered, and Roll
if the message is delivered (promise, Don’t Roll, Roll). By not making a promise
the trustee reduces the likelihood that the trustor plays In and there is no cost
of breaking a promise. However, if one assumes that there is a cost of breaking
a promise even when the message is not delivered, then it is not necessarily
true that the strategy (promise, Don’t Roll, Roll) dominates the strategy (no
promise, Don’t Roll, Roll). This is because in this case the benefit of making a
promise (increased probability of trustor playing In if the message is delivered)
is countered by the cost of breaking a promise (choosing Don’t Roll) when the
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message is not delivered.
Finally, somewhat unexpectedly we find that trustees who did not make a
promise were more likely to act trustworthy when their message was delivered
than when it was not.2 This shows that the effect of communication on the
trustworthiness of trustees does not depend on the content of the message (on
a promise). One possible explanation for this positive effect of messages being
delivered could be that it reduces the social distance between the trustee and
the trustor. The fact that something (a sheet of paper) that was in the trustee’s
possession is later in the trustor’s hands may create some commonality.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide experimental evidence in support of the commitment-
based explanation for promise keeping. Our results suggest that people have a
preference for keeping their word per se. The expectations based guilt aversion
theory cannot explain the results we obtain. In addition, we show that the
impact of communication on trustworthiness does not depend on the content of
the message. Communication increases trustworthiness both for trustees who
make a promise and for trustees who do not make a promise.
2Even trustees who wrote nothing on their message sheet were more likely to act trustworthy
when their message sheet was delivered than when it was not (4 out of 7 when delivered
compared to 0 out of 7 when not delivered).
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A Instructions
We tried to stay as close as possible to the instructions in Charness and Dufwen-
berg (2006).
Instructions
Thank you for participating in this session. The purpose of this experiment
is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask
us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other
participants during the experiment.
You will receive AC3 for participating in this session. You may also receive
additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon
completion of the session, your money will be paid to you individually and pri-
vately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no
participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is
paired.
Decision tasks
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the
role of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your
pair. Those sitting behind desks 1-12 have the role of A; those sitting behind
desks 13-24 are B.
By clicking a button on the computer screen, each person A will indicate
whether he or she wishes to choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, then A and
B each receives AC5. Next, each person B will indicate whether he or she wishes
to ROLL or DON’T ROLL (a die). Note that B will not know whether A has
chosen IN or OUT; however, since B’s decision will only make a difference when
A has chosen IN, we ask B’s to presume (for the purpose of making a decision)
that A has chosen IN.
If A chooses IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, then B receives AC14 and A
receives AC0. If A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL, then B receives AC10 and rolls
a six-sided die to determine A’s payoff. If the die comes up 1, A receives 0; if the
die comes up 2-6, A receives AC12. (All of these amounts are in addition to the
AC3 show up-fee.)
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Note that to conceal the identity of Bs who choose DON’T ROLL, every B
will roll a die after making a choice. However, the outcome of a die roll will be
irrelevant for those who choose DON’T ROLL.
The information on payoffs is summarized in the chart below:
A receives B receives
A chooses OUT AC5 AC5
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL AC0 AC14
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1 AC0 AC10
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die =2,3,4,5 or 6 AC12 AC10
Pre-play message stage
Prior to the decision by A and B concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to
send a message to A. Each B receives a blank sheet on which a message can be
written, if desired. We allow time as needed for people to write messages, then
these will be collected. Please write clearly if you wish to send a message to A.
In these messages, no one is allowed to identity him or herself by name or
number or gender or appearance. (The experimenter will monitor the messages.
Violations - experimenter discretion - will result in B receiving only the show-up
fee, and the paired A receiving the average amount received by other A’s.) Other
than these restrictions, B may say anything he or she wishes in this message. If
you wish to not send a message, simply circle the letter B at the top of the sheet.
When B has completed the message, he or she should put it face down on the
table. The experimenter will then collect the message and check it.
Important: After all messages have been collected, exactly half of them will be
randomly chosen by the experimenter. The messages not chosen will be replaced
with empty sheets (i.e., without the letter B on top). Then, the experimenter
will distribute the messages and empty sheets to the corresponding As. If A
receives an empty sheet, it means that the message by B in his or her pair was
not selected to be delivered. The identification numbers of all messages chosen
will be written on the whiteboard so that each B knows whether or not his or
her message will be delivered to A.
Bonus for guessing
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At some point during the experiment, you can earn a bonus of up to AC1.50
by correctly guessing a decision or outcome. You will receive the necessary infor-
mation on your screen.
Information
Each player will know only her or his own earnings at the end of the ex-
periment. Other than what can be concluded from these earnings, you will not
receive any other information.
15
B Beliefs, Choices, and Behavior
As mentioned in the main text, we measured beliefs of As and Bs during the
experiment. In measuring beliefs we followed Vanberg(2008) with some minor
differences. To elicit first-order beliefs, after As made a choice to play In or Out,
we asked them to guess the actual payoff of the trust game in case they chose In
or what would be their payoff had they chosen In in case they chose Out. Note
that unlike Vanberg (2008) we asked A to guess the (would be) payoff of the game
rather than the choice by B. We wanted to prevent A from being able to infer
B’s choice from the bonus payment for guessing.3 Each A was shown a screen
with the explanation of the task, and the information shown in Table B.I, and
was asked to choose one of the five columns from the table. Each column shows
bonus payments that depend on the (would be) final payoff of the trust game.
This way we elicited first-order beliefs of A regarding the (would be) outcome of
the game.4 5
To elicit second-order beliefs of Bs, they were shown the screen that was shown
to A and invited to guess the column chosen by A. For the correct guess B earned
a bonus of AC1.50.
We, first, start with reporting the results on the relationship between beliefs
and choices made for both As and Bs. Then, we show the relationship between
beliefs and promises.
Table B.II reports average beliefs for As and Bs depending on the condition
and choices made. In both conditions, the average beliefs of As who played In
were higher than those of As who played Out. The differences are significant at
the 10% level as shown in the table. Moreover, in both conditions, the average
guesses of Bs who chose Roll were higher than those of Bs who chose Don’t
Roll. The differences are statistically significant. Similar results are reported in
3This is not a problem in Vanberg (2008) because in his experiment subjects played for
eight rounds and different rounds were randomly chosen for game payoff and guessing bonus
payments.
4Assuming risk neutrality the columns correspond to intervals with midpoints at probabili-
ties 87.5%, 67.5%, 50%, 32.5%, and 12.5% of receiving 0 as payoff.
5We did not consider hedging to be a problem. Blanco et al.(2010) show that hedging is
not a problem in a game similar to ours. This is despite the fact that they paid subjects much




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Almost Almost
certainly Probably Probably certainly
Your guess AC0 AC0 Not sure AC12 AC12
Your bonus if you
(would) receive AC0
AC1.30 AC1.20 AC1.00 AC0.70 AC0.40
Your bonus if you
(would) receive
AC12
AC0.40 AC0.70 AC1.00 AC1.20 AC1.30
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
Table B.II
Choices and Beliefsa
A’s average guess B’s average guess
Condition In Out Z stat Roll Don’t Roll Z stat
Message not delivered 48% 40% 1.55* 59% 43% 2.37***
(17) (37) (16) (38)
Message delivered 50% 40% 1.52* 60% 46% 2.51***
(37) (17) (29) (25)
a The Z stat reflects the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The number of observations is shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively for
one tailed test
Table B.III shows average guesses by As and Bs in each condition, depending
on whether a promise was sent or received. One can see that in the Message not
delivered condition average second-order beliefs of Bs did not depend on whether
a promise was sent or not. Thus, promises were not correlated with beliefs. This
shows that the impact of promises in the Message not delivered condition cannot
be explained by a change in second-order beliefs.




A’s average guess B’s average guess
Condition P NP Z stat P NP Z stat
Message not delivered 42% — 48% 48% -0.13
(54) (36) (18)
Message delivered 49% 44% 0.96 55% 53% 0.31
(34) (20) (34) (20)
a The Z stat reflects the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The number of observations is shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 respectively for
one tailed test
estimated the impact of promises on the probability of choosing Roll controlling
for second-order beliefs in the Message not delivered condition. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses:
Roll =− 4.57 + 1.87 ∗ Promise + 0.76 ∗ Second-order belief
(1.36) (0.88) (0.31)
The coefficient on the promise dummy is positive and significant (p=0.03).
This confirms that in the Message not delivered condition the positive impact of
promises on trustworthiness cannot be due to changes in second-order beliefs.
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C List of messages
In the table below, C = Coding, S = Status, P = Promise, NP = No Promise, D
= Delivered, ND = Not Delivered, R = Roll, and DR = Don’t Roll.
Table C.I
Messages from B
Sess. ID Message C S Choice
1 11 I will roll Please choose in, I won’t be as lame as to lie to
you to make myself 4 euro richer and you 12 euro poorer
P ND R
1 12 NP D DR
1 13 Dear person A, I hope you receive this message I wrote for
you,especially because it isn’t my greatest hobby to write.
I would like to encourage you to choose IN. At least I can
speak for myself that I will always choose for Roll, and I
think every B will do. Because then our common win is the
greatest. And it has been proven that decisions based on
fear are less rational and productive than decisions based on
trust. So, especially because we’re both on the university,
we should choose for the greatest common win. I will. Good
luck and have a nice day.
P D DR
1 14 NP ND DR
1 15 I am committed to do everything in my power so that BOTH
of us can earn more than AC5.
P ND R
1 16 I will choose ROLL, please choose IN P ND DR
1 17 Dear A player, I know there is a risk in this game and we
don’t know each other, But if you choose IN I promise I will
ROLL so that we can both maximize our chances to win
more.Please trust me we are partners and we want the best
for each other. But now,let’s come to the point. I propose
that you decide IN and I will definitely promise to ROLL the
die, so that your chance of getting paid will be bigger than
when I DON’T ROLL. Good Luck,I hope we can trust each




Table C.I - Continued
Sess. ID Message C S Choice
1 18 Hello partner! Of course I will send you a message, just
because we are partners and we want the best for each other.
But now, let’s come to the point. I propose that you decide IN
and I will definitely promise to ROLL the die, so that your
chance of getting paid will be bigger than when I DON’T
ROLL. Good Luck, I hope we can trust each other! your
partner , B.
P D R
1 19 I will choose ROLL for sure that goes into the benefit of both
of us. You can trust me. So you can choose IN.
P ND R
1 20 I will choose ROLL because this will give 100% more than
if you choose OUT. Please choose IN so we can both have
more earnings :). I am cool with you earning 2,- more since
I will also get a lot more than just the 5,- !
P D DR
2 13 Please choose IN. I ’ll choose Roll definitely. So we could
win-win. I know that it is still take the risk for you. But I
think 5/6 possibility for AC12 is much better than AC5, isn’t
it?
P D DR
2 14 NP D R
2 15 I will choose Roll, die=5 P D DR
2 16 Hello A, If you choose IN I’ll choose Roll, so you have more
chance of earning money, and I do too! Don’t think negative,
because that will have an negative outcome as well! (If you
choose don’t roll you’ll probably earn less than when you
choose Roll) I hope you make the right decision! B
P D DR
2 17 Hello. We can cooperate so that we have both have a nice
pay-off. If you choose IN, than I will promise to choose to
roll the die. Because your chance will be 5/6 to get AC12, I
think this is a good option for you too! :) Because that is
the maximum amount you can earn! I hope we will have a
good co-operation!:) Bye.
P D DR
2 18 For the better outcome, I will choose Roll. Your payoff will
depend on the Die number. Otherwise, we will both receive
AC5.
P D R
2 19 I wish we could do it best. I wish you trust me. Money
is important, but is not everything. I know you are facing
a bigger risk. But have faith, my friend. I trust that your
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2 20 Let’s play! I don’t want to stay here a whole hour for just 5
EUR. You have a 5 out of 6 chance to get 12 EUR. And I am
willing to sacrifice 4 EUR (get 10 instead of 14) in order to
get 5 more (get 10 instead of 5). We play together, we both
win more! It’s always like that at these experiments! Good
luck and thanks in advance for making the right choice!:)
P ND R
2 21 Dear My Pair A, If you play IN, you can trust me that I
choose ROLL. So, let our luck determine our earnings. By
5/6 luck, you can get 12 Euro. Love B
P ND R
2 22 I believe in win-win And U? NP ND R
2 23 NP ND DR
2 24 Please choose IN, I won’t cheat by choosing DON’T ROLL.
I promise that I will choose ROLL. We don’t want to end
up with only 5 euro, right? If you choose in, and I choose
roll, there is ONLY 1/6 probability that you’ll get AC0. But
there’s 5/6 prob that you’ll get AC10. So please choose IN
P ND DR
3 11 This is a typical prisoner dilemma, if you know economics.
Best result only possible if we trust each other. I always rely
on trust in these experiments and will do the same this time,
despite the fact that there is a little risk for me if I decide to
throw a dice (and no risk for you). I will ROLL. Decide to
trust me or not.
P ND R
3 12 NP D R
3 13 Dear A: Please choose IN! because then the total gain for us
will be maximum. It’s good for everyone. Here is the out-
come; If you choose Out, then total gain will only minimum
amount. If you choose In, and B choose Roll, you have large
possibilities to gain 12. It’s quite high! Best B
NP D DR
3 14 The reason that we came here is to deal with risk, and also
earn some money. If you decide to stop that means that
we both have 5 AC. So we’re both equal. BUT we can go for
more and I mean that the 4th alternative sounds nice because
you receive 7ACmore, this requires risk. In the end , you
choose what you think is better. We both study economics
or business so we both know when we’re better off. Good
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3 15 I will choose roll. I hope that you’ll choose IN. That’s fair for
both of us. In that case, we’ll have the same expected income
(AC10). That’s better than the case that we only receive AC5
each. Best regards
P ND R
3 16 Hello A if you choose to be In, I will choose to roll the die,
then you have a 5/6 chance of receiving AC12,- if you don’t
choose in, you only get AC5,- we will help each other thanx
P D R
3 17 NP ND DR
3 18 maximize both side’s payoff NP ND DR
3 19 I promise I will choose to Roll. So you are choosing between
1) Expected return = AC5*100%=AC5 2) Expected return =
AC12*5/6= AC10. If I were you, I will surely choose the one
with higher expected return. Anyway, you can make any
choice you like. Just remember that I will certainly Roll.
P D R
3 20 If you choose in, I would be glad to choose Roll, maximizing
our overall profit. In fact since you give the chance to win
additional 5 euro when you choose IN. I won’t have the in-
centive to deprive of your opportunity of earning 12 euro as
return.
P D R
4 13 Good morning! NP D DR
4 14 Hi A, Please choose for “IN” so I can choose for “ROLL”
and we might both earn a nice amount of money. B
P D DR
4 15 The best situation for both of us is that you choose in, I
choose roll the die. Then the total payoff is maximized. This
game theory problem can be solved if we cooperate. I don’t
have the incentive to get 4 more to let you get nothing. So
this is what I’m trying to say. Please think about getting
“IN”!:)
P D R
4 16 It’s a waste of time if we all earn AC5. Also, it’s not fair for
you to earn nothing. So, you IN. I will ROLL. And let God
decide.
P ND R
4 17 Apparently, no matter what your choice is, AC5 is at least
what I can get from. But of course I would like to ask you
choose “In”, not only because I can be better off, so do you.
Since the chance of getting “die=1” is only 1/6, which is very
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to choose “Roll”. Then your payoff can be doubled, so will
mine. Everybody is happy :P.
4 18 It’s better off that I choose Roll while you choose IN, even if
it might mean I may end up earning less AC14. but it’s better
than getting AC5 (It’s not a trick!). I know A would choose
Out for safety, even If you might get 0 for die but it’s a low
probability.
NP ND DR
4 19 Hi, please choose IN!!! If you choose IN. I promise I will
choose ROLL. As AC10 is better than AC5. And for me there
is no difference of what the die will be. But for you, if you
choose IN, you’ll have the 5/6 possibility to get AC12. It’s the
result of gain off.
P ND DR
4 20 I will choose to roll. Hope you can choose In. P ND DR
4 21 Always chooses In and I will chooses Roll. Then we can get
the highest payoff. Good luck with two of us! Lol!
P D R
4 22 If you A want to get better payoff. Please trigger to choose
“IN”! Let’s Roll!
P D R
4 23 It’s okay for me to have a Revenue of AC10 (at least AC5 higher
than a revenue of AC5) So I will choose to roll the die.
P ND DR
4 24 If you choose IN. I will choose ROLL. Trust me!!! P D R
5 11 In order to get higher payment for you and me both, I sug-
gest you choose “in”. If you choose in, you don’t need to
worry about I will choose “Don’t Roll”. In the end of the
experiment, I promise the result can only be win-win.
P ND R
5 12 I will choose Roll and I do not mind If A even get higher
payment.
P ND R
5 13 I hope you will choose IN, I ’ll roll and both if us have the
benefit from cooperation. Better cooperation, better earn-
ing.
P ND R
5 14 I think it is a good idea to choose “IN” for A. Then I will
choose “ROLL”.
P D R
5 15 I would like to cooperate. NP D R
5 16 If u choose in and the die comes up 2-6 u will receive AC12
and I AC10. So it is a win/win for both of us. Good luck.
NP D DR
5 17 Please choose in, and I promise to roll the die. You’ll have
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5 18 Hope you choose “IN” great chance for both of us to get
more money.
NP ND DR
5 19 I am a person who really cares about fairness. So, no mat-
ter what you choose, I will choose ROLL. This is the most
profitable and fair decision that I can make for the benefit
of us both.
P ND DR
5 20 NP D R
6 11 You choose IN, I choose ROLL. You have 5/6 chance almost
guaranteed. We both go home happy instead of only AC5.
P ND DR
6 12 I will choose “ROLL”. P ND R
6 13 I will Roll the dice, since AC10>AC5 P ND DR
6 14 Let’s win some money! NP D DR
6 15 I am usually in advantage case I know. But if you wanna DO
BUSINESS with ME for BOTH of US have a chance to earn
HIGHER, Please choose IN. I WILL ROLL THE DICE!!!
Why? Because; 8.5 or 10 or 14. The differences are not so
much in this case for me to cheat you. Believe in me or not
depends on you. Once again, I WILL ROLL, no matter what
your choice is. Thank.
P ND DR
6 16 Let’s cooperate!!! Both of us can gain more!! Thanks! NP D DR
6 17 Pls choose IN, and I will choose to ROLL. In this case , you
have a much higher return, say, AC12 than AC5. As for me,
both AC14 and AC10 are much better than AC5. So hope you
choose IN, and both of us get a win-win. Thank you.
P D DR
6 18 Dear friend, please choose IN. I promise you I will choose to
ROLL. You can trsut me, I don’t want you to leave with “0”
money. We are all in need of money in the end. In case you
choose IN there is a very very big possibility that you get
AC12, and we go home both happy. It is much better than
just AC5. So choose IN :)
P D R
6 19 I am ready to give Four Euro’s up, your choice. P D R
6 20 Hello, If you get this message accept my assurance that I
gonna ROLL and this will increase your A’s average income.
I’d like to write my ANR and name so that you’d be sure,
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7 11 Do what you want. NP ND DR
7 12 A choosing IN and B choosing roll creates - a chance of 100%
for B to get 10 euros - a chance of about 83% for A to get
12 euros
NP D R
7 13 NP D DR
7 14 “Life is a rollercoaster, then it drops” NP ND DR
7 15 Do not choose OUT NP D DR
7 16 NP ND DR
7 17 I will choose ROLL. When you choose IN we both have a
big opportunity to receive 10euro(me) or 12 euro (you if
die=2,3,4,5,6). A smile.
P D DR
7 18 NP D DR
7 19 NP ND DR
7 20 NP ND DR
8 11 Choose IN please, I’ll Roll then. P ND DR
8 12 Let’s cooperate to have the best outcome with an expected
revenue of 12*1/6+10=20euro which means you choose IN
and I choose roll
P ND R
8 13 If you choose IN than I will choose Roll. So we both have a
good pay-off (unless the die =1)
P ND DR
8 14 I will choose to Roll the die, so that you have more than 80%
chances to get 12 euros :). Choose IN, it’s only a game.
P D R
8 15 NP D R
8 16 When you will choose IN, I will choose to roll the die. P ND R
8 17 I will definitely choose Roll, if you choose IN. P ND DR
8 18 To get more payoffs we could cooperate. I will not choose
“Don’t Roll”, which gives you incentive to chosse In. Then
you will get expected payoff of 10 euros, which is definitely
better than receiving only 5 euros for both of us. You should
consider it carefully.
P D DR
8 19 Please choose IN NP D R
8 20 If you choose IN and I choose Roll it’s a fair game for both. NP D DR
9 13 You choose IN and I will choose Roll, that means you have
the chance of 5/6 to receive 12 euros and I will receive 10
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9 14 I will choose Roll. You should choose IN to earn 12 euros. P ND DR
9 15 It is better for us if you choose IN because I will choose Roll
and if that your expected earning will higher than choosing
Out, you wstill have 5/6 chances to get 12.
P D R
9 16 If you choose IN , I promise I will choose the option Roll. P ND DR
9 17 Strategy don’t roll strictly dominates Rollfor B. Thus B may
choose “Roll” as optimal strategy.
NP D DR
9 18 hey! I’ll Roll, for sure! P D R
9 19 In order to benefit both of us in this experiment, I think we
can choose “in” and “Roll”.
NP D R
9 20 NP ND DR
9 21 A -> IN => B-> ROLL ==> Ex(Ra) = 10$, RB=10$. NP ND DR
9 22 I promise I will choose Roll. P ND DR
9 23 Whatever the decision you made, you will earn 3 euro just
participating this session. Then; if you choose OUT you will
earn extra 5 euro but if you go on to IN option; there is a
high probability to earn 12 euro extra since after rolling die
5/6 prob->get 12 euro, 1/6 prob -> get 0 euro. -> Thus;
just try your chance and go IN option at the end the max
will be 12+3=15 euro(max) but in out option you will get
(max) only 5 euro and since money is as if an extra in any
case take risk and choose IN.
NP D R
9 24 I think win-win is better! Die=1 only has 1/6 probability,
maybe we can try it! The best strategy is cooperation!
NP ND DR
10 13 Hi, If you choose IN, I promiss I will choose Roll. When I
don’t ask this, you will probably choose OUT SO IT’S FOR
YOU MUCH BETTER AND FOR ME TOO. You can trust
me, I will choose ’roll, but I understand that you may be
hesitate about this. However, I am honest :-)
P ND DR
10 14 I decided to Roll a die, let’s make our common outcome
bigger!
P ND R
10 15 The win-win situation should be u choose IN and I choose
Roll. Your expected return would be 12*5/6=10, twice as
much as you can earn by choosing Out! Trust me, 14 euros
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10 16 You IN, I Roll we are both better off. P ND DR
10 17 B will roll P D DR
10 18 I will choose ROLL. Please trust me and choose IN so that
you have a good chance to earn 12 euros instead of 5 euros.
P ND DR
10 19 Please choose in and I will chose Roll. There is 5/6 proba-
bility for you to earn 12 euros.
P D R
10 20 I have a proposal. If you choose In. I promise! I will choose
Roll so it’s a 5/6 chance that if I roll the die , you will receive
12 euros, and I will receive 10 euros.
P D DR
10 21 Hi A, I think you should choose In! I promise you that I
will Roll the die, the chance that I will throw 2,3,4,5, or 6
is really high. I think we both get the best out of this test
then. Greetz B.
P D DR
10 22 Hi, I will choose Roll THE DIE. In this case you will have a
5/6 chance of getting 12euros (on top of the 3 euros). I will
choose Roll because if you choose IN, It will give me 5 euros
extra. Kind regards, B
P ND DR
10 23 Hi, The best chance of getting + 10 euros is to roll the dice
and you choose IN. Chance of getting 12 euros for you and
10 euros for me is than 5/6. That would be fair.
NP ND DR
10 24 If you choose IN, I promise I will choose Roll, because in that
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